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COMMENT/Union Authorization Cards-Insufficient
Protection for Misled Employees
I. Introduction
A labor organization1 may become the collective bargaining representative
of the employees in a given bargaining unit2 either by winning an election
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board s or by obtaining the sig-
natures of a majority of the employees on union authorization cards.4 There
are basically two kinds of authorization cards, which are solicited by union
representatives and by sympathetic employees during the union's organiza-
tional campaign. One states that the signer designates the union as his col-
lective bargaining representative (single-purpose card).5 The other has an
identical provision, but contains the additional clause that the union may use
the cards to secure an NLRB election (dual-purpose card), A recurring
problem is the employer's claim that some cards have been obtained through
misrepresentations made to the employees by the solicitors.
Although a union possesses authorization cards from a majority7 of the
employees in an appropriate unit and demands recognition as the majority
representative, the employer may refuse to recognize and bargain with the
union because of a good faith doubt s that the union represents a majority
which has freely and validly authorized the union to represent them. In a
complaint case alleging violations of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1),9 the employer's
1. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2 (5), 61 Stat. 138 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 152 (5) (1964).
2. Id. § 9 (a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a)- (b) (1964).
3. Id. § 9 (c) (1) (A) (i), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (1)(A)(i) (1964).
4. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-2 (1956). For a con-
trary view, see Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 1967).
6. See, e.g., Shelby Mfg. Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 464, 466 (1965).
7. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9 (a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1964) provides that a bargaining representative must be designated by a
majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
8. The employer must have a good faith doubt concerning the validity of a union's ma-
jority if he is to avoid a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act). See Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966) for the basic rules gov-
erning this principle.
9. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8 (a) (5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... Id. § 8 (a) (1), 61
Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (1964).
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obvious defense is that cards) were obtained as a result of mispresenta-
tions made to the employees. Under certain circumstances such cards will be
invalidated, possibly eliminating the union's claimed majority upon which
the demand for recognition and bargaining was based. Even where the
invalidated cards do not destroy the union's majority, the misrepresentations
may establish that the employer had a good faith doubt of the majority at
the time he refused to bargain. In either case, a bargaining order will not
issue.
Two of the most common misrepresentations made by solicitors to em-
ployees are: (1) that all or a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit
have already signed cards' 0 -this will be referred to as a majority status
misrepresentation, and (2) that the cards will be used to obtain an NLRB
election"l-a purpose misrepresentation.
Where either of these misrepresentations is made, the overriding question
which arises is whether the employee has voluntarily and validly designated
the union as his bargaining agent. 12 Several interrelated issues must be con-
sidered in answering this question. Is the misrepresentation itself material
or immaterial to the validity of the card, i.e., should a misrepresentation be
accorded sufficient weight to invalidate a signed authorization card? If the
misrepresentation is material, under what circumstances will it actually in-
validate a card? Is a signer's testimony as to his intent at the time of signing
admissible to establish the invalidity of the card? What is the probative
value of such testimony? Which party has the burden of proving a card's
validity or invalidity? This comment will discuss the state of the law with
respect to these questions and suggest solutions to the problems they present.
I. Materiality of Misrepresentations
The initial inquiry in this area is whether the misrepresentation is material
to the validity of the card. If the misrepresentation is held material, it may,
10. E.g., I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (1967); Merrill Axle & Wheel
Serv., 158 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1966); Top Mode Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1952), enforced,
203 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).
11. E.g., Freeport Marble & Tile Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 810 (1965); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
143 N.L.R.B. 848 (1963); Englewood Lumber Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961). There are
various other kinds of misrepresentations: e.g., a representation that an authorization card
was "just an address card," M. Koppel Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 8 (1967) (trial examin-
er's decision); representations that a card would be kept confidential, or that cards would
be destroyed "after the count was taken," Converters Gravure Serv., Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. No.
53, at 13 (1967) (trial examiner's decision).
12. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1964) provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations ... and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities ...." (Emphasis added.) The NLRB has long recognized that em-
ployees are to exercise their right to choose their representative in an uncoercive atmos-
phere. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
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under certain circumstances, act to invalidate the card. If the misrepresenta-
tion, however, is immaterial, it will not under any circumstances invalidate
the card. Since the Board has developed different tests for each of the two
kinds of misrepresentations-majority status and purpose-each will be
treated separately.
Misrepresentation as to a Union's Majority Status
The Board's treatment of the cases which question the materiality of majority
status misrepresentations has been inconsistent. Top Mode Manufacturing
Co.'s was the first Board decision dealing with this problem. A union solici-
tor, in that case, told two employees that all other employees had signed
cards. The trial examiner found that when this representation was made
only 19 of the other 21 employees in the unit had in fact signed.' 4 The
Board ruled:
[T]his sort of claim... though untrue or exaggerated, is certainly
not fraud affecting the employees' grant of bargaining authority. On
the contrary, it is clearly quite common and harmless "sales talk"
which is ordinarily not taken seriously by the employees to whom it
is made, and, in any event, is subject to ready check by the employees
as to its truth.
15
It is clear that the Board considered this false representation immaterial.16
In H. Rohtstein & Co.,' 7 an employee testified at the hearing before a trial
examiner that he signed only in reliance on the representation that the
union already had a majority, and that he found the representation to be
false a few days later. The Board affirmed the trial examiner's holding that
the card was valid, relying on the Top Mode characterization of such repre-
13. Supra note 10.
14. Id. at 1296 (trial examiner's decision).
15. Ibid.
16. It will be observed that the false representation made in Top Mode was not flagrant.
The solicitor said, in effect, that all other employees had previously signed cards when, in
fact, 19 of the other 21 had done so. The Board's dismissing this misrepresentation cannot,
however, be predicated on the fact that the union had clearly established its majority with-
out the two cards in question. The Board held two cards valid which were obtained under
an identical misrepresentation in G & A Truck Line, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1967),
but there, the two cards were necessary to the union's majority.
While the two cards in question in Top Mode were not material to the union's majority,
they still could have been decisive on the issue of whether the employer had a good faith
doubt as to the union's majority status. If he did, barring other unfair labor practices, no
bargaining order would have been issued against him. See Aaron Bros., supra note 8.
The next case decided by the Board on the misrepresentation issue was E.H. Sargent &
Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1318 (1952), where the Board held questioned cards to be valid because
it was not established that at the time the representation was made, it was indeed false.
The Board said, however: "'the testimony of a signer as to his subjective state of mind at
the time of signing, cannot operate to overcome the effect of his overt action in having signed
the application cards.'" Id. at 1323.
17. 120 N.L.R.B. 1556 (1958).
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sentations as immaterial "sales talk." The first circuit, the first appellate court
to consider this issue,18 reversed the Board's decision and held that by its
nature this type of misrepresentation is material. The court added that
where a card is signed in reliance on a material misrepresentation, it is in-
valid. The court expressed surprise that the Board continued unquestioningly
to adhere to its original position on materiality.19 The rationale of Top Mode,
that an employee could discover the falsity of the representation made to
him, was attacked. "[I]t is difficult to see how [the employee] could have
readily checked the truth of [the solicitor's] statement."20 The only two
ways in which an employee might determine the truthfulness of the repre-
sentation are by requesting the union's records or by asking each employee
in the bargaining unit whether he had signed a card. The first method seems
fruitless, for if the union has made a false representation, it is unlikely that
it will then voluntarily impeach itself through its own records. The effective-
ness of the second method is also questionable, since an employee's fellow
workers may, for various reasons, decline to state whether they have signed
cards, or they may not answer truthfully.21 The Rohtstein court also question-
ed the Board's statement in Top Mode that employees do not ordinarily
take these representations seriously; the Board itself presented no support for
its position. Testimony of signatories in subsequent cases has demonstrated
that this statement is inaccurate.22
In Englewood Lumber Co.,23 the NLRB for the first time expressly held
misrepresentations to be material. It appears that this decision was prompted
by the first circuit's reversal of the Board in Rohtstein. The significance of
Englewood Lumber was underscored in TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc.,24 where
the trial examiner, holding two cards invalid, pointed to what he considered
18. NLRB v. H. Rohtstein & Co., 266 F.2d 407 (lst Cir. 1959).
19. Id. at 409: "[Bloth of the Board's grounds for its policy of nonconsideration of misrep-
resentations of success insofar as the determination of majority designation is concerned,
namely, the harmlessness of such claims and their readily verifiable nature, appear to be lack-
ing in the instant case, yet the application of this policy was accepted without question by
the Board."
20. NLRB v. Rothstein & Co., supra note 18, at 409.
21. An employee could not inquire of his employer either, as the latter has no access to
cards until such time as the union chooses to present them in support of a demand for
recognition.
22. The quantity of recent litigation raising this issue, and the testimony of card signers
to whom misrepresentations have been made indicate that reliance is often placed on such
representations. See, e.g., S.E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 121, at 13 (1967) (trial
examiner's decision); Henry Colder Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 13, at 28 (1967) (trial examiner's
decision).
23. Supra note 11. Although the representation involved in Englewood Lumber did not
concern the union's majority status, later cases apparently viewed it as the turning point with
respect to the question of materiality of representations as to majority status. See, e.g., TMT
Trailer Ferry, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1495 (1965).
24. Supra note 23, at 1507.
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an apparent change in position on the materiality question. He alluded to
the court's decision in Rohtstein, and then distinguished his case from prior
Board decisions which had held majority status misrepresentations immate-
rial.25 He based his decision on the fact that here the solicitor had falsely
stated that "all" other employees had signed cards, 26 and characterized this as
a "gross misrepresentation. '2
7
For some time after Englewood Lumber, the Board did not return to the
position that false representations of majority status are immaterial. In some
cases, the Board followed the first circuit's decision in Rohtstein, and held
the cards invalid.28 In others, while holding the cards valid, the Board did
so on the ground that the signers did not rely on the misrepresentations,
sub silentio indicating that the misrepresentations were material. 29 A few
cases were decided on the ground that no misrepresentations were, in fact,
made.3 0
In Merrill Axle & Wheel Service,8' the NLRB returned to its original posi-
tion, as announced in Top Mode. There, the employer contended the au-
thorization cards of four employees were invalid, since the solicitors had
falsely stated to the employees that "most" or a "majority" of their co-workers
had already signed, and that these employees would not have signed except
for such misrepresentations.8 2 The Board rejected this contention, quoting
25. E.g., Top Mode Mfg. Co., supra note 10; H. Rohtstein & Co., supra note 17.
26. TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., supra note 23, at 1507. Note, however, that the same misrep-
resentation was made in Top Mode.
27. Id. at 1507. Unlike Top Mode, a majority of the employees had not signed cards.
28. S.E. Nichols Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1201 (1966); Shapiro Packing Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 777
(1965); TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., supra note 23; Neuman Transit Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 659
(1962).
29. Indiana Rayon Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 130 (1965); Freeport Marble & Tile Co., supra
note 11.
30. Gafner Automotive & Mach., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 577 (1966); Pizza Prods. Corp., 153
N.L.R.B. 1265 (1965); Ottenheimer & Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 38 (1963), enforced, 334 F.2d 581
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
Two cases are difficult to analyze. In United Mineral & Chem. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 1390
(1965), the trial examiner expressed doubt as to the validity of cards obtained where false
majority representations had been made, but found it unnecessary to decide the question,
since the union's majority would have been unaffected by discounting the cards in question.
The Board apparently assumed that the examiner had ruled on the issue and concluded that
he properly held these cards invalid. The Board must have considered the representations
material. John Kinkel & Sons, 157 N.L.R.B. 744 (1966) involved the same kind of represen-
tation. The trial examiner held the authorization card valid on the ground that the repre-
sentations were immaterial. The Board affirmed, but steered away from the immateriality
argument.
[I]n addition to the reasoning of the Trial Examiner... the record does not indicate any
reliance by the employee upon... [the] remark.... To the contrary, the record shows
that... when ... [the employee] ... discovered that not "everybody" supported the
Union, she still "didn't want to" withdraw her card.
Id. at 744-45.
31. 158 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1966).
32. Id. at 1119.
1968]
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the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Cactus Petroleum,
Inc.:33
[The employer's] position is premised on the testimony of five (5)
employees that they would not have signed cards except that the
Union told them that all or a majority of the employees had signed
authorization cards. We agree with the Board's rejection of this
testimony on the basis that the testimony of the signers as to their sub-
jective state of mind at the time of signing did not here operate to
overcome the effect of their overt action in signing.
8 4
The Board went on to say:
We believe, in agreement with the court's statement, that the same
representation of the type here considered are [sic] immaterial in
determining a union's majority status on the basis of signed author-
ization cards, and there appears no reason even for receiving any
testimony concerning such matter.s 5
The Board considered the most significant phrase in Cactus Petroleum
to be that " '[the signer's] subjective state of mind.., did not here operate
to overcome the effect of... signing.' ,6 (Emphasis added.) The Board must
have construed "here" as referring to the kind of representation being exam-
ined, i.e., a false representation about the union's majority status. This is
evidenced by the Board's language quoted above, which speaks of "the same
representation of the type here considered .. . ."37 (Emphasis added.)
There are two reasons why the Board's reliance on the court's language is
inappropriate and why that language does not conclusively support the
broad holding in Merrill. First, the meaning that the Board gave to the
word "here" is probably incorrect. The better interpretation is that "here,"
as used in Cactus Petroleum, limits the court's language to the particular
factual situation of the case. The trial examiner in Cactus Petroleum clearly
pointed to the unreliability of the employees' testimony that they had signed
the cards only because of the false representations; he found this testimony
totally incredible.88 It is likely that the court addressed itself to this factual
situation when it used the word "here," because of the unusually harsh lan.
guage of the trial examiner.
A second reason why the Board's use of Cactus Petroleum was apparently
incorrect is its interpretation of that case as holding majority status misrep-
resentations immaterial. The fifth circuit in Cactus Petroleum must have
33. 355 F.2d 755, 760 n.8 (5th Cir. 1966).
34. Merrill Axle & Wheel Serv., supra note 31, at 1114.
35. Id. at 1115.
36. Id. at 1114.
37. Id. at 1115.
38. Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 1254, 1270 (1961).
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impliedly found that this type of misrepresentation was material, since the
court would not even have had to reach the issue of subjective testimony if
it had held the misrepresentation immaterial.a9 The Board implicitly recog-
nized this fact when it said, "there appears no reason even for receiving any
testimony concerning such matter." Thus, the Board's ruling in the Merrill
case, insofar as it is based on Cactus Petroleum, is unsupported.
Why did the Board rely upon the language of Cactus Petroleum to hold
misrepresentations of majority status immaterial in Merrill? The cases
from Englewood Lumber to Merrill demonstrate that it is more appropriate
to say that the Board acquiesced in, rather than followed, the court's
decision in Rohtstein.4 0 It is significant that in a few cases decided before
Merrill, the Board did invalidate authorization cards because of misrepre-
sentations as to majority status.41 In no case during this period, however, did
the Board hold misrepresentations immaterial. The first circuit's opinion in
Rohtstein appears to have exerted great influence on the Board's thinking
concerning this issue, yet nowhere did the Board expressly adopt the rule in
Rohtstein. No circuit court supported the rule established in Top Mode until
Cactus Petroleum was decided, and that support is weak, if not completely
erroneous. The Board's reliance on this kind of authority indicates a policy
preference for considering majority status misrepresentations immaterial,
thus preventing them from affecting the validity of authorization cards.
Board decisions dealing with the issue of the materiality of majority
status misrepresentations after Merrill are inconsistent. These cases fall
into three classes. In the first, no misrepresentation was found, but in each
case, the trial examiner indicated that, if there had been misrepresentations,
they would be immaterial.4 2 The Board affirmed these decisions. The
second class cites Merrill, but for the proposition that the signer's subjective
state of mind at the time of signing is not relevant to the validity of the card.
43
These cases avoid the materiality question in the Merrill decision. The third
class ignores the Board's decision in Merrill and relies on the court's holding
39. The court in Cactus Petroleum did not actually discuss whether a majority status
representation might invalidate cards under other circumstances. The court merely ruled
that the Board's rejection of subjective testimony was proper in the situation of this case. See
NLR.B v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc., supra note 33, at 760 n.8.
40. NLRB v. H. Rohtstein & Co., supra note 18.
41. See cases cited supra note 28.
42. Better Val-U Stores, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 71, at 8 (1966) (trial examiner's deci-
sion); Viking Bag Div., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 51, at 4 n.9 (1966) (trial examiner's decision).
See also Sonora Sundry Sales, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1966); Phil-Modes, Inc., 159
N.L.R.B. No. 84, at 8 (1966) (trial examiner's decision), where the examiner in dicta says
cards would be valid in any event, citing Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 919
(1966), incorrectly for this proposition.
43. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 110, at 21 n.8 (1966) (trial examiner's
decision); Nashville Lumber Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 104, at 6 (1966) (trial examiner's
decision).
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in Rohtstein. In each of the cases, however, the trial examiners held, and the
Board affirmed, that the cards in question were valid, on the ground that
reliance on the misrepresentations was not shown.44 In Home Pride Provi-
sions, Inc.,45 the trial examiner held some cards valid because he found no
misrepresentations and others valid because he found no reliance on misrep-
resentations. The Board affirmed the validity of the cards, but did not agree
with the trial examiner's reasoning: "Even if such misrepresentations had
been made, we would not in the circumstances of this case regard them as mate-
rial in determining the validity of authorization cards."4 6
In all of the above cases, only one authorization card was held invalid on
the ground that a majority misrepresentation was made. This occurred in
Pembek Oil Corp.,47 where the Board, in the absence of exceptions 48 to
the trial 'examiner's finding the card invalid, adopted his ruling pro forma,
but cited Merrill.
49
In effect, the NLRB reversed Merrill with its decision in I.T.T. Semi-
Conductors, Inc.50 There, the Board reversed the trial examiner who had
held that "a false representation as of existing majority made by one who
solicits signatures vitiates the cards without proof of reliance on such repre-
sentation." 51 In rejecting this reasoning, the Board stated:
[O]ur cases uniformly hold that a card .. . obtained [by misrepre-
sentation] can be rendered invalid only upon proof that it would
not have been subscribed but for the erroneous representation or
that the misrepresentation operated coercively by putting signers
in fear of majority reprisal. Home Pride Provisions, Inc.; N.L.R.B.
v. Sagamore Shirt Company; Merrill Engineering Laboratories [ci-
tations omitted]. Such proof as was adduced regarding either of
these grounds was insufficient to establish, on the record made before
the Trial Examiner, that card signers relied on or were coerced by
the representations-if they were made, and if they were wrong-
by the Union.
52
The citation of Merrill in I.T.T. Semi-Conductors indicates that the Board
certainly did not intend to reverse Merrill. Nevertheless, the conclusion that
44. Sandy's Stores, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 95, at 31 n.55 (1967) (trial examiner's deci-
sion); Henry Colder Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 13, at 28 (1967) (trial examiner's decision);
Home Pride Provisions, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 47, at 7-8 (1966) (trial examiner's decision).
45. Supra note 44.
46. Id. at 2 n.2.
47. 165 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1967).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1967).
49. Pembek Oil Corp., supra note 47, at 1 n.l. Since the litigants did not challenge the trial
examiner's decision, the Board let the decision stand. But in citing Merrill, the Board indi-
cated its disagreement with the Pembek decision.
50. 165 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (1967). Two members of the three man panel who decided this
case also sat on the three man panel in Merrill.
51. Id. at 14 (trial examiner's decision).
52. Id. at 4.
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it did reverse is inescapable. The Board's citation of Merrill, to support the
statement that its cases "uniformly hold" that a misrepresentation may invali.
date a card, is improper. The strong language of Merrill is inconsistent with
the principle announced in I.T.T. Semi-Conductors.
The only way in which Merrill can be reconciled with I.T.T. Semi-
Conductors is to construe the "representation of the type here considered"
in Merrill53 as a representation which is relied on by signers or which puts
signers in fear of majority reprisal. This interpretation in untenable. Mer-
rill must have classified representations according to their type, i.e., majority
status misrepresentations, and not according to whether the signer relied on
it or was coerced by it. This reasoning is supported by the fact that the
Board in Merrill noted that there was no need to take testimony concern-
ing majority status misrepresentations since they were immaterial. Obvi-
ously, the Board did not rely on an employee's reaction to the false repre-
sentation in determining materiality, since it could see no reason for
ascertaining what that reaction was.
54
The Board, in Home Pride Provisions, which is also cited as authority in
I.T.T. Semi-Conductors,55 suggested that the materiality of a representation
depended upon the circumstances of the case,56 citing Merrill as authority
for this proposition.57 It is not clear what the Board meant when it referred
to the "circumstances." Since the trial examiner had found no reliance on the
representations,SS the Board may have used the term "material" only to
refer to a misrepresentation upon which there was reliance. This possible
definition of "material," however, was surely dispelled by the later case of
Pembek Oil Corp.59 There, a card was held invalid by the trial examiner
because of reliance on the misrepresentation. The Board, in the absence of
exceptions, had to adopt this finding pro forma, but in so doing, cited cases
which held misrepresentations immaterial. 60 This demonstrates that the
Board was not employing the above possible definition of "material." In any
event, if Home Pride Provisions does support I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, both
cases are in conflict with the reasoning of the Board in Pembek Oil.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB (Sagamore Shirt Co.)61 was used
as authority in I.T.T. Semi-Conductors,6 2 and does support that decision. The
53. Merrill Axle & Wheel Serv., supra note 31, at 1115.
54. Ibid.
55. Supra note 50, at 4.
56. Home Pride Provisions, Inc., supra note 44, at 2 n.2.
57. Ibid.
58. Id. at 10 n.25 (trial examiner's decision).
59. Supra note 47.
60. Id. at I n.1.
61. 365 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
62. Supra note 50, at 4 (Amalgamated is cited in I.T.T. Semi-Conductors as NLRB v.
Sagamore Shirt Co.).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited Rohtstein with
approval, adding that cards would be invalid where the misrepresentations
"were a means of coercing employees to sign cards out of a fear of majority
reprisal."63
In one case involving a majority status misrepresentation decided after
I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, the Board 64 upheld the validity of the three authori-
zation cards in question on two grounds. 65 The first was that the evidence did
not establish any substantial misrepresentation. Second, the Board relied on its
earlier decision in Merrill, stating that the representations were "immaterial
in determining the Union's majority status on the basis of signed authoriza-
tion cards ...."66 The Board also reiterated its reliance on Cactus Petroleum.
The Board's latest statement on majority status misrepresentations is found
in G & A Truck Line, Inc.67 There, the trial examiner held two cards "void,
ab initio," since he considered the misrepresentation that everyone else had
already signed "substantial and critical." 68 The Board reversed, stating that
"the Board has held, with Court approval, that statements of this type are
immaterial in determining the validity of authorization cards .... Such state-
ments are harmless salestalk [sic] or puffing....,69 (Emphasis added.) The
Board cited and clearly followed Merrill and Top Mode.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Board currently adheres to G & A Truck
Line, despite the Board's varied treatment of the majority status misrepre-
sentation issue throughout the case law. With Merrill, the NLRB escaped the
shackles of the first circuit's Rohtstein decision. Recent cases indicate that
LT.T. Semi-Conductors was but an unwanted intrusion upon the Board's
position.70 The Board has now returned to its original position in Top Mode.
There are two reasons for this. One is that the Board has consistently demon-
strated that it wants to consider majority status misrepresentations as imma-
terial. Second, the Board now feels that it is supported by at least two circuit
courts of appeals. 71 It is questionable whether the NLRB will continue to
adhere to G & A Truck Line, however, in view of the seventh circuit's recent
decision in NLRB v. Dan Howard Manufacturing Co.,72 where the court
63. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB (Sagamore Shirt Co.), supra note 61, at
908. This decision may have prompted the Board's holding in I.T.T. Semi-Conductors.
64. The three man panel was the same which decided I.T.T. Semi-Conductors.
65. S.E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 121, at 13 (1967) (trial examiner's decision).
66. Id. at 13 (trial examiner's decision).
67. 168 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1967).
68. Id. at 10 (trial examiner's decision).
69. Id. at 2.
70. G & A Truck Line, Inc., supra note 67; S.E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., supra note 65.
71. The District of Columbia circuit in Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB (Saga-
more Shirt Co.), supra note 61, and the fifth circuit in NLRB v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc.,
355 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966).
72. 67 LR.R.M. 2278 (7th Cir. 1968).
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stated: "We follow the Rohtstein holding as being the wholesome rule tend-
ing toward a more forthright solicitation of authorization cards."73
The NLRB, by holding authorization cards valid, although signed in re-
liance upon a majority status misrepresentation, does not concede that such
a representation may cause an employee to sign a card he would not have
otherwise signed. Such a position is both untenable and unrealistic. 74
Misrepresentations as to the Purpose of an Authorization Card
Englewood Lumber Co. 75 was the first case in which the Board expressly
dealt with the question of whether an authorization card should be invalidat-
ed because of a solicitor's false representation that the card was to be used to
petition the NLRB for an election, when, in fact, the card was used to demon-
strate a union's majority. The Board held that it did invalidate the card.
The position taken in Englewood Lumber was construed in Cumberland
Shoe Corp.,76 where the Board distinguished between representations that
one purpose of the card is to support a petition for an NLRB election, and
representations that the card is to be used only for an election. The Board
has consistently held that representations of the first kind are immaterial and
will not invalidate a card,77 while those of the latter kind are material and
will. 78 Evidently, the Board does not consider representations that cards will
be used for an election to be false, because a union may either use the cards to
evidence its representation of a majority of the employees or to petition the
NLRB for an election to decide its majority status.79 The sole situation in
73. Id. at 2280.
74. It is certainly possible that an employee may want to get on the bandwagon if he be-
lieves all other employees have already signed cards. A majority status misrepresentation
may also lead an employee to believe that the union has already become his bargaining rep-
resentative and he may then sign to avoid any possible reprisals from the union.
75. 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961).
76. 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
77. E.g., Lake Butler Apparel Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 863 (1966); Dayco Corp., 157 N.L.R.B.
1459 (1966); Cumberland Shoe Corp., supra note 76.
78. E.g., Dixie Cup, 157 N.L.R.B. 167 (1966); Hamburg Shirt Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 511
(1965), enforced, 371 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
79. The rationale rests upon Board rules governing the use of authorization cards. Cards
signed by thirty percent of the employees in a particular bargaining unit are sufficient to sup-
port a union's petition for an NLRB election. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act) § 9 (e) (1) (a), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (e) (1) (1964). Cards from
fifty percent of the employees are sufficient to establish majority representation, and will
oblige an employer to bargain collectively with the union. See United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956). Since the card may be used for both purposes,
a representation that a card will be used to obtain an election is not false. The fact that the
card is not, in fact, used to obtain an election has been termed a condition subsequent. Nor
does the Board distinguish between a union's failure to even seek an election and a union's
withdrawal of its election petition due to employer unfair labor practices. The union may
withdraw such a petition and seek a bargaining order on the basis of cards in an unfair labor
practice proceeding under Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
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which a false representation will be found to exist is where the union repre-
sents that only the latter alternative will be taken.8 0
The Board's application of the Cumberland rule has been relentlessly
strict. In Fur's, Inc.,8s a solicitor was asked by an employee if execution of
the cards resulted in automatic designation of the union. He was told that the
employees "had to get an election first."8 2 The card was held valid, since
the solicitor did not say the card would be used solely to obtain an election.
A union organizer in Bishop & Malco, Inc.,8 3 stated: "I told employees that
the card was not binding on them and that they still have freedom of choice,
and that the employees in the secret ballot could vote against the Union, for
the purpose of the card was to give them that right."'8 4 (Emphasis added.)
There was no secret ballot. The cards were held valid because the words
"only" and "solely" were not used.8 5
The circuit courts are not in complete agreement with respect to the issue
of materiality in these cases. The sixth circuit affirmed the Board's rule in
NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp.so That court, however, in its recent de-
cision in NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc.,87 clarified its position with
respect to the Cumberland rule:
We believe that whatever the style or actual words of the solicitation,
if it is clearly calculated to create in the mind of the one solicited
a belief that the only purpose of the card is to obtain an election,
an invalidation of such card does not offend our Cumberland rule.
88
The court found four cards invalid, thus destroying the union's majority.
Cumberland was distinguished from Swan in that the earlier case involved
clear, single-purpose cards designating the union as the signer's bargaining
representative. 89 The seventh circuit has recently adopted the Swan inter-
80. South Bay Daily Breeze, 160 N.L.R.B. No. 145, at 16 (1966) (trial examiner's
decision).
81. 157 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966).
82. Id. at 394.
83. 159 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1966).
84. Id. at 1160 n.4.
85. Numerous other Board cases demonstrate the Board's application of the Cumberland
rule.
86. 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
87. 384 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967).
88. Id. at 618.
89. The court also distinguished Swan from its earlier decision in Cumberland on the
ground that the general character of the solicitation in Swan concentrated on creating the
impression that an election would be held. Prior to Swan, the sixth circuit distinguished be-
tween -the single-purpose cards used in the Cumberland case from dual-purpose cards, used
in Dayco Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1967). There the Cumberland rule was
affirmed as applying to single-purpose cards, but the cards in Dayco were invalidated. See also
Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1967); Pizza Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 369 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965).
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pretation of the Cumberland rule.9 0 The eighth circuit adopted a position
similar to that of the sixth and seventh circuits in Bauer Welding & Metal
Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 where cards were held invalid in the absence
of an "only" representation.
2
The Board has not distinguished between single- and dual-purpose cards.
It applied the Cumberland rule in Peterson Bros., Inc.,93 holding that a num-
ber of dual-purpose authorization cards were valid designations. The fifth
circuit reversed the Board on this point, noting that all dual-purpose cards
are ambiguous per se.9 4 In a later case, the same court refused to accept the
Cumberland rule, where a single-purpose card was used by the union, deem-
ing the rule "too lax a standard."95
The second circuit agrees with the fifth. In NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co.9 6
that court reversed the Board, which had found that the card was valid in
the absence of an "only" representation. The court held that "[a]ny fair view
of the record shows that [the employee] was induced to sign the card by the
representation that the union needed her signature to secure an election and
never understood she was taking it on as her representative without one."
97
(Emphasis added.) The fourth circuit has flatly refused to apply the Cumber-
land rule.98
90. NLRB v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 67 L.R.R.M. 2278 (7th Cir. 1968). The court dis-
tinguished this case from its earlier decision in Happach v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.
1965), which had generally supported the Board's Cumberland rule. "We do not view this
as a departure from the holding in Happach v. NLRB ... since we interpret Happach in the
same manner as the Sixth Circuit interpreted Cumberland in its opinion in the Swan case."
NLRB v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., id. at 2281. The court thus found that the Cumberland
rule did not apply where the character of the solicitation of cards created the impression that
an election would be held.
In NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1964), the court had rejected certain cards
finding "overwhelming proof that many employees signed cards because they were promised
that such cards were to be used for the purpose of obtaining an election .... " (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 773. Apparently the court found an "only" representation here, and thus was
not at odds with the Cumberland rule. In NLRB v. Fosdal, 367 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1966) and
NLRB v. C.J. Glasgow Co., 356 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1966), the court had clearly adopted the
Cumberland rule.
91. 358 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1966).
92. In Matthews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1965), the court had held cards
obtained on a purpose representation valid, but the court pointed out that the union organ-
izers had informed the signers that the cards could be used in support of a bargaining
demand.
93. 144 N.L.R.B. 679, 682 (1963).
94. NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965).
95. Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 1967).
96. 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967).
97. Id. at 444. Other second circuit cases dealing with purpose representations are: NLRB
v. Niskayuna Consumers Cooperative, Inc., 64 L.R.R.M. 2127 (2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Gotham
Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Divigard Baking Co., 367 F.2d 389
(2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
98. Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 66 L.R.R.M. 2529 (4th Cir. 1967), petition for cert.
filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1968) (No. 1050); NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co.,
66 L.R.R.M. 2596 (4th Cir. 1967). Cf. NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 66 L.R.R.M. 2603
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Several circuit courts have adopted the Board's Cumberland rule. The
District of Columbia circuit flatly stated that it upheld the rule. 99 That court,
however, has also consistently and emphatically stated that the rule applies
"where the cards are unambiguous on their face .... ,,100 (Emphasis added.)
The three latest cases' 0' in which the District of Columbia court dealt with
the Cumberland rule involved single-purpose authorization cards which can-
not be construed as ambiguous. Therefore, whether the court would apply
the Cumberland rule where dual-purpose cards are involved is question-
able.102 Faced with the recent rulings in S.E. Nichols and Swan, the court
stated that "Cumberland does not articulate an absolute rule, but rather
a useful and well founded rule of thumb."' 03 Thus, Cumberland is not en-
dorsed so enthusiastically by the District of Columbia circuit as by the Board.
The first 0 4 and tenth' 05 circuits, however, have adopted and applied the
(4th Cir. 1967). In affirming the Board's bargaining order, the court pointed out that the
employer had made an independent investigation into the union's majority claim and found
it to be valid. Subsequently, the employer claimed that some employees had signed cards
believing them to be applications for free insurance. This case closely resembles NLRB v.
Mutual Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1967), discussed infra note 106.
99. United Automobile Workers v. NLRB (Preston Prods. Co.), 66 L.R.R.M. 2548 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
100. Id. at 2552.
101. Ibid.; Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB (Hamburg Shirt Corp.), 371 F.2d
740 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB (Sagamore Shirt Co.), 365
F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
102. In NLRB v. S.N.C. Mfg. Co., 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965), enforcing 147 N.L.R.B.
809 (1964), the District of Columbia circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held cards challenged
on a purpose representation valid. Dual-purpose cards were involved. Three later cases, cited
supra note 101, while supporting the Cumberland rule, all involved single-purpose cards and
stressed the absence of any ambiguity of the cards in question. This stress on the lack of
ambiguity is of note in the light of the concurring opinion of Judge Burger, where the dual-
purpose cards there involved were termed "misleading." S.N.C. Mfg. Co., id. at 363.
103. United Automobile Workers v. NLRB (Preston Prods. Co.), supra note 99, at 2552.
The court distinguished its case from S.E. Nichols and Swan on the ground that in those
cases the unions had never actually petitioned the NLRB for an election, while in Preston
such a petition was filed. The apparent reasoning supporting this distinction is that where
a union actually does file a petition, its prior representations that an election would be con-
ducted are not false. The fact that the petition is later withdrawn due to alleged employer
unfair labor practices does not render false the prior representations of an election, i.e., the
union has acted in good faith. The Board has never recognized such a distinction.
The distinction drawn by the court has no merit when viewed, as it should be, from the
employee's viewpoint. If it is conceded that an employee has signed a card because he be-
lieved he would be able to vote in an election, there is no sound reason for validating his card
when he has not been able to vote. Surely the intricacies of NLRB procedure should not
operate to aid the union to the detriment of the employee's Section 7 rights. Nor should
the union be rewarded because of the employer's violations in a manner which deprives the
employee of his rights.
104. NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 380 F.2d 851 (1st Cir. 1967). The
same court did invalidate cards challenged on the ground that they were obtained through
a purpose misrepresentation. NLRB v. Freeport Marble & Tile Co., 65 L.R.R.M. 2655 (1st
Cir. 1967), denying enforcement in part, 153 N.L.R.B. 810 (1965). This case does not ac-
tually repudiate the Cumberland rule, however, as the card involved here was sui generis.
It stated: "no obligation if no election, or if stonecutters fail to win [e]lection." Id. at 2658-
59. Apparently the court viewed the card's language as an "only" representation, while
the Board did not.
105. Fun's, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1967).
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Cumberland rule; the ninth circuit in a per curiam holding also indicated
support of this rule.106
Generally, the circuit courts of appeals are tending to move away from the
Board's strict application of Cumberland. This tendency is justified in view
of the NLRB decisions in Furr's and Bishop & Malco. The Cumberland rule
should be rejected, for it ignores an employee's guaranteed rights to refrain
from joining a labor organization. The Cumberland rule is disturbingly un-
realistic. It was pointed out in Swan that:
A sophisticated and only modestly talented union agent could easily
live with such a narrow rule and, leaving out the bad words - "sole"
and "only" - employ language clearly calculated to lead a woman
laundry worker to believe that the holding of an election was all that
she signed up for.
107
The above statement must be viewed with respect to another made by Chief
Judge Haynesworth in NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co.:10s
It is well known that many people, solicited alone and in private,
will sign a petition and, later, solicited alone and in private, will
sign an opposing petition, in each instance, out of concern for the
feelings of the solicitors and the difficulty of saying "No." x09
This would seem especially true where union solicitors constantly badger em-
ployees to sign cards. The solicitor may continuously talk of an election, but
never of using the cards to prove the union's majority. One must also con-
sider the fact that many employees are poorly educated or even illiterate.
These facts are ignored by the Board in absence of the magic words "sole" or
"only."
III. Grounds for Invalidating Authorization Cards
Obtained by Misrepresentation
Once a particular kind of false representation is established as material to the
validity of a designation, the question becomes, under what circumstances
will the representation in fact invalidate a particular authorization card? To
decide that the false representation is material means only that it is a proper
subject of inquiry as to whether a card is a valid designation of a union as the
signer's bargaining representative. The Board and the courts have suggested
106. NLRB v. Mutual Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1967), enforcing 159 N.L.R.B.
No. 73 (1966). After the employer had recognized the union's majority, he then challenged it
on the ground that purpose misrepresentations had been made. Another peculiar fact was
that some signators did not testify at the hearing, and others testified that they understood
the nature of the cards and had been union members in the past.
107. NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., supra note 87, at 620.
108. Supra note 98.
109. Id. at 2599. See also the dissent of Judge Timbers in NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg.
Co., supra note 97.
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more than one criterion upon which to base a finding that a card is invalid.
In dealing with false representations as to the purpose of a card, the Board
has generally relied only on the fact that a false representation was made and
has not questioned whether the signer was actually influenced by the misrep-
resentation.1 1 0 Where solicitors represented that cards were to be used only
for an election, the cards were held invalid on the sole ground that the rep-
resentation was made."' Invalidating an authorization card automatically
upon misrepresentation fails to meet the issue involved in these cases. The
question to be answered here is, has the employee voluntarily designated the
union as his bargaining agent?"
2
The principle of automatic invalidation stated in Englewood Lumber
Co.113 has never been adopted by the Board in a case involving a false repre-
sentation as to a union's majority status."l 4 The Rohtstein court stated that
this kind of misrepresentation invalidated a designation only where the card
was signed in reliance on the misrepresentation."15 Under this rule, if it can
110. E.g., Dean Indus., Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 5 (1966) (trial examiner's deci-
sion); S.E. Nichols Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1201, 1209 (1966); Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144
N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
111. E.g., South Bay Daily Breeze, supra note 80, at 14, 15, 17 (trial examiner's decision)
(the cards of Cole and Ceder); Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 919 (1966). Mem-
ber Brown has consistently held the view that:
To invalidate signed designations written in clear and unambiguous language on the
basis of employee testimony adduced in ... an atmosphere [of unfair labor practices by
an employer] about whether the solicitor said the card would be used only to obtain an
election is, absent evidence of fraud, coercion, or other serious infirmity, but to ignore
the proven wisdom of the parol evidence rule and to assist a tortfeasor to benefit from
his own wrong doing. In addition to subjecting employees to undesirable pressures, such
a practice ... makes a semantical game of the decisional process.
Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 805, at 807 n.5 (1966).
112. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1964). "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations .... "
113. 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961).
114. In one case, the trial examiner seemed to hold the contrary, but the Board did not
comment on his finding. "[Mrs. Christjohn] testified that she would not have signed the card
if she had known that 'the whole company didn't sign it.' Mrs. Christjohn, an elderly, posi-
tive woman, impressed me as a credible witness. While I have some doubt that Mrs. Christ-
john was so naive as to have relied upon Clabaugh's representation that everyone else in the
plant had signed, I accept her testimony, not controverted by Clabaugh, that he did make
the statement to her. Because of this material misrepresentation, I conclude that Mrs.
Christjohn's card is invalid." Pizza Prods. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1265, 1271 (1965).
In Shapiro Packing Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 777, 784 (1965), the trial examiner held a card ob-
tained on a majority status misrepresentation invalid without explicitly stating whether
he found reliance on the misrepresentation. The fact that he cited NLRB v. H. Rohtstein
& Co., 266 F.2d 407 (1st Cir. 1959) and Neuman Transit Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 659 (1962) is
strong indication that he did, in fact, find reliance on the misrepresentation.
For a somewhat different interpretation of these cases, see I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, Inc.,
165 N.L.R.B. No. 98, at 14 n.29 (1967) (trial examiner's decision), in which the trial ex-
aminer attempts to establish that authorization cards obtained on majority status misrepre-
sentations have been invalidated without reference to reliance.
115. NLRB v. H. Rohtstein & Co., 266 F.2d 407, 409 (1st Cir. 1959).
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be shown that an employee would have signed the card in spite of the false
representation, the designation will be valid. On the other hand, if it can be
shown that the employee signed in reliance upon the misrepresentation, the
card will be invalidated as a designation of the union.""
In those cases following Rohtstein, in which the Board generally adhered
to that decision, inquiry is clearly made into the question of whether or not
there was reliance on the representation." 7 Where none was found, the cards
in question were held valid.118
In some recent cases, trial examiners have considered reliance in ruling on
the validity of cards where representations as to purpose were made." 9 Other
recent decisions dealing with identical misrepresentations do not discuss
reliance. 120 The Board generally has not concerned itself with this disparity,
as it adheres to its ruling that cards are invalid when obtained upon the false
representation that they will be used only for an election.
121
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, dealing with a majority
status misrepresentation, stated that such misrepresentation "does not vitiate
the cards unless the comments were a means of coercing employees to sign
cards out of a fear of majority reprisal."' 22 The court also cited the first cir-
cuit's decision in Rohtstein which advanced the reliance test. 2 3 These tests
can be viewed as producing an identical result in most cases involving a ma-
jority status misrepresentation if the employee relied upon the misrepresenta-
tion because he knew the union had already become the representative of all
employees, and did not want to disadvantage himself with his new represent-
ative. On the other hand, reliance might be found in the case of an employee
who merely did not want to be part of the minority, yet was in no fear of
majority reprisal. In one case,124 a card which was invalidated because of re-
liance would certainly not have been invalidated under the fear-of-majority-
reprisal rule; however, the false representation involved was not one of ma-
116. Ibid., I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 98, at 4 (1967).
117. E.g., Sandy's Stores, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 95, at 31 n.55 (1967) (trial examiner's
decision); Henry Colder Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 13, at 24-29 (1967) (trial examiner's
decision).
118. Ibid.
119. Trend Mills, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 143, 162 (1965). The trial examiner held an author-
ization card, obtained on a representation that the card would only be used for an election,
invalid. Madison Brass Works, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1966); Freeport & Tile Co., 153
N.L.R.B. 810, 823 (1965). The trial examiners held cards obtained on representations that the
cards would be used for an election valid. In none of these cases did the Board discuss reli-
ance, probably because the results were identical to those which would have been reached
under the Board's Cumberland rule.
120. Cases cited supra note 110.
121. Ibid.
122. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB (Sagamore Shirt Co.), 365 F.2d 898, 908
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
123. Id. at 908 n.21.
124. Neuman Transit, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 659 (1962).
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jority status. The solicitor falsely told the employee that his best friend had
signed. Relying on this representation, the employee signed the card. If the
two tests are construed differently, it is clear that a greater number of cards
would be invalidated under the reliance test.
The Board, in I.T.T. Semi-Conductors,125 united the two tests, stating:
"[A] card [obtained by a majority status misrepresentation] can be rendered
invalid only upon proof that it would not have been subscribed but for the
erroneous representation or that the misrepresentation operated coercively by
putting signers in fear of majority reprisal."' 126 This test was overruled sub
silentio by the Board's later decision in G & A Truck Line, Inc., 27 where
the Board returned to its position in Merrill.
To counter an employee's testimony that he signed a card in reliance on a
misrepresentation, it is sometimes argued that he made no attempt to revoke
the card after discovering that the representation was false. In an early case,
the trial examiner noted this fact, but did not decide the case on this point;
neither did the Board, holding a majority status misrepresentation to be im-
material to the validity of the card. 128 In some cases, the fact that an employee
made no attempt to revoke his card was apparently considered sufficient proof
that the employee did not rely on the misrepresentation. 129 This view has
been supported by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.18 0
It is unrealistic to put the affirmative burden of revoking an authorization
card on an employee in order to prove reliance on a misrepresentation. It is
true that an employee's attempt to revoke a card may be a strong indication
of reliance, but should inaction be used as evidence against his testimony?
It should not. An employee may not attempt to revoke his card if he does not
know that he can revoke, or if he does not know how to revoke it. In addition
to this is the fact that the union may avoid aiding him in revoking the card.
By considering an employee's inaction as strong and conclusive evidence
125. Supra note 116.
126. Id. at 4.
127. 168 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1967). Since the Board had held the misrepresentations im-
material, there was no need to apply the I.T.T. Semi-Conductors test.
128. H. Rohtstein & Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1556 (1958).
129. E.g., Atlas Engine Works, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1967); Home Pride Provisions,
Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1966); Crawford Mfg. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1966); Lake
Butler Apparel Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 863 (1966); Indiana Rayon Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 130,
supplemented, 151 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1965).
130. NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M. 2916, 2919 (1st Cir.
1967).
[T]he vacillating testimony of employees in the hearing, held almost a year after the or-
ganizing campaign concluded and almost eight months after the election, under the
scrutiny of company counsel and officials, illustrates the wisdom of requiring fairly
strong evidence of misrepresentation and evidence of communication of recantation be-
fore cards secured at a much earlier date are adjudged invalid.
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against his testimony, the Board imposes a duty of action upon him if he is
to regain his Section 7 rights which he should never have lost.
IV. The Admissibility of Subjective Testimony
May a signatory testify at an NLRB hearing as to why he signed an authori-
zation card, i.e., may he testify concerning his subjective state of mind and
intent at the time of signing? The landmark case of Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v.
NLRB 131 provided the following answer: "It has been held that an employee's
thoughts (or afterthoughts) as to why he signed a union card, and what he
thought that card meant, cannot negative the overt action of having signed
a card designating a union as bargaining agent. ' ' 22 This position has
generally been followed by the Board and the courts.'8 3
The court in Joy Silk Mills made it clear, however, that this rule was ap-
plicable only in the absence of fraud. 34 Professor Wigmore points out that
all but one state hold admissible testimony as to a witness's state of mind.13 5
He also states that unilateral acts are voidable because of fraud, duress, or
mistake. An exception to the parol evidence rule is made to show the exist-
ence of these factors.136 The Board, however, has consistently held subjec-
tive testimony inadmissible in cases involving misrepresentations as to pur-
pose.1 37 In Englewood Lumber, the Board specifically disclaimed considera-
tion of "what may or may not have been [the employees'] subjective reaction
to what they were told."' 38 The Board's position on this issue is made ap-
parent by the separate opinion of Member Jenkins in that case. 3 9 A clear
restatement of the Board's position appears in Aero Corp.,140 where the trial
131. 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
132. Id. at 743.
133. E.g., Dayco Corp., 65 L.R.R.M. 3092 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Gorbea, 300 F.2d
886 (1st Cir. 1962); Gary Steel Prods. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1963); Economy Food Cen-
ter, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 901 (1963).
134. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLR.B, supra note 131, at 743.
135. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 581 (3d ed. 1940).
136. 9 id. § 2423.
137. E.g., Dan Howard Mfg. Co., supra note 111; Aero Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1283 (1964);
Englewood Lumber Co., supra note 113.
138. Englewood Lumber Co., supra note 113, at 395.
139. Id. at 400.
My colleagues are unwilling to rely here upon the intention signified by the employ-
ees' action in signing the authorization cards, and they disclaim reliance upon the sub-
jective state of mind of the employees who signed the cards. They prefer instead to rely
upon the alleged representations of card solicitors, whatever the understanding of the
employees as to why they signed the cards. This disposition is not only without support
in the cases but it lacks any rational basis. For it disregards entirely the single critical
factor in these cases, namely, the intent of the employee in signing a designation card.
The dissent did not advocate reliance on intent. Its basic position was that the representa-
tions were immaterial.
140. Supra note 137.
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examiner excluded cross examination concerning the subjective state of mind
of witnesses who had signed cards. The Board said:
The questions propounded ... were intended to go into the question
of "why... [the witness] signed the card." We agree with the Trial
Examiner that Respondent's counsel was inquiring into the subjec-
tive state of mind of the employee at the time the card was signed, a
matter which is not material to a determination of the validity of the
cards.' 41 (Emphasis added.)
In a later case, a trial examiner admitted subjective testimony by the signers
concerning their intent at the time of signing.' 42 The Board, however, has
never specifically approved such testimony where false representations as to
the purpose are involved.
143
The Board finds no reason to admit such subjective testimony, apparently
because it is unnecessary to do so under its Cumberland rule. By this view, a
representation that a card will be used for an election is not a misstatement
of fact. But a representation that a card will be used only to obtain an election
is a factual misstatement.
The courts of appeals have overwhelmingly disagreed with the Board on
the question of admissibility of subjective tesimony where a misrepresenta-
tion as to purpose is present. 44 One court has even admitted subjective testi-
mony where no affirmative misrepresentation had actually been made. In
NLRB v. Peterson Brothers, Inc.,145 the fifth circuit held that the Board
erred in refusing to consider testimony of card signers who thought the
cards were signed to secure an election. The court pointed out that the cards
were ambiguous. This decision is at odds with Joy Silk Mills. The fifth circuit
was not able to convince the Board to adopt its viewpoint. In Furr's, Inc.,1 46
the Board subsequently stated:
While some employees appear mistakenly to have believed that
the cards were but a prelude to an election, the purpose and effect
of the card is expressed in concise and unambiguous terms and
the subjective state of mind of the signator-as contrasted with rep-
resentations made to him as an inducement to sign-is not
relevant.1
47
Here the NLRB is strictly applying the Cumberland rule with complete dis-
141. Id. at 1291.
142. South Bay Daily Breeze, 160 N.L.R.B. No. 145, at 17 (1966) (trial examiner's decision).
143. Id. at 1, 2.
144. E.g., NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (7th Cir.
1964); Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1966).
145. Supra note 144.
146. 157 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966).
147. Id. at 398,
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regard for the fact, which the Board admits, that some employees believed
the cards to be merely a prelude to an election. Such belief was induced by
constant talk of an election, but without the use of the words "only" and
"solely." The Furr's case certainly should have proved to the Board the fal-
lacy of its Cumberland rule. It did not.
Subjective testimony of an employee's intent at the time of signing a card
where a misrepresentation as to majority status is made has been held ad-
missible by both the Board and the courts.148 Where the Board holds
misrepresentations immaterial, of course, there is no need for such
testimony.
149
V. The Probative Value of Subjective Testimony
Once subjective testimony is admitted, a more difficult problem arises. What
is the probative value of that testimony? The Board has consistently held that
such testimony has dubious probative value,15 0 one reason being that it is
not subject to cross examination.' 51 Furthermore, considerable time gen-
erally passes between the date of signing the card and the date testimony is
given, during which "the interests of the witnesses have been fixed by the
passage of time and events ... .,"152 A basic assumption is that an employee is,
to some degree, under the control of his employer and can often be readily
influenced by him. Thus, another factor bearing on the problem of proba-
tive value appears where the signer is still working for the same employer. 153
The Board also makes much of the fact that such witnesses must testify in the
presence of their employer and his counsel. 54
Some courts of appeals have agreed with the Board on the question of proba-
tive value. 15  This agreement has been expressed in cases where testimony
of the witnesses was inconsistent, 156 or where the objective circumstances
established the exertion of influence upon the witnesses by their employ-
er.157 A striking example of the latter case is found in NLRB v. Sunshine
148. E.g., NLRB v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 355 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. H.
Rohtstein & Co., supra note 115; S.E. Nichols Co., supra note 110; John Kinkel & Son, 157
N.L.R.B. 744 (1966). The Board, of course, has no reason to admit such testimony under
its holding in G & A Truck Line, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1967).
149. Merrill Axle & Wheel Serv., 158 N.L.R.B. 1113, 1115 (1966). See also G & A Truck
Line, Inc., supra note 148.





155. NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc., supra note 130; NLRB v. Sunshine
Mining Co., 110 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1940).
156. NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc., supra note 130, at 2916.
157. NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., supra note 155, at 790.
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Mining Co. 158 This influence was clearly shown by the court. The Board,
however, does not require such a showing.
The very fact that an employer-employee relationship exists casts doubt
on the testimony of the witness. In other words, the exertion of influence up-
on the employee by his employer is assumed, though none is actually
shown. The apparent rationale for this position is that since the employee
knows that his employer is against the union and there is the possibility that
the employer will contest the validity of his card, he stands in fear of reprisal
by the employer; for example, he may be fired or he may lose his seniority. The
argument is well taken. The fact that an employee's well-being is largely af-
fected by his employer cannot be denied. Despite these realities, the Board
places too much weight on this assumption.
Where nothing more is present than proof of a misrepresentation and the
testimony of the signer of a card that he would not have signed but for the
misrepresentation-barring the possibility that "the witness does not convey
any impression of solicitude for the truth"159-the card should be invalidated.
With the operation of the assumption, however, such a result is unlikely.
That the assumption aids the union's case is undeniable.
VI. Burden of Proof
The General Counsel for the NLRB, who represents the union as the charg-
ing party, has the burden of proving that an authorization card is a valid des-
ignation.160 First, the card is introduced as evidence; the signature and
date are then authenticated. Once this is done, the General Counsel has
made a prima facie showing that the card is a valid designation. If no objec-
tive circumstances casting doubt upon the card are proved, such as a majority
status misrepresentation having been made, the card is accepted as a designa-
tion of the union.18 1
158. Id. at 790.
[Employer] produced as witnesses some employees who said that they had signed the
cards and paid initiation fees for the sole purpose of voting against the strike. Some
other employees testified that by signing the cards they had not intended to designate
the Union as the representative for collective bargaining. As pointed out in the findings
of the Board, the testimony of these witnesses given after the failure of the strike in which
they had participated was not sufficient to overcome the effect to be given to their hav-
ing previously joined the Union or signed the membership cards designating the Union
as the bargaining unit. Besides their conduct and demeanor while testifying, ,there was
other evidence tending to discredit these witnesses; they had been restored to their
former positions with the company while others similarly situated were denied re-
employment. As demonstrated by the Board, this discrimination was brought about
through the intervention of certain individuals acting for or with respondent and who,
at the time the testimony was given, were present confronting these witnesses. In view
of all these circumstances we cannot say that the finding of the Board was not justified.
(Emphasis added.)
159. Cactus Petroleum, Inc., supra note 150, at 1270.




Does the proof of a misrepresentation sufficiently damage the prima facie
case of the General Counsel so as to shift the burden of proof back to him?
The Board holds that it does not.162 In I.T.T. Semi-Conductors,'6 the
Board stated: "[A] card ... obtained [upon a misrepresentation] can be ren-
dered invalid only upon proof that it would not have been subscribed but
for the erroneous representation or that the misrepresentation operated co-
ercively by putting signers in fear of majority reprisal."'164 (Emphasis
added.)
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is apparently in agreement with
the Board.165 On the other hand, the fifth circuit has declared that "the gen-
eral counsel must show that the subjective intent to authorize union repre-
sentation was not vitiated by such representations." 166
The better view is that advanced by the fifth circuit. Once the validity of
a card is impeached by proof of a misrepresentation, should not the General
Counsel be required to reestablish validity? The burden of proof is on him
originally, and, once he introduces a card with proof of signature and date,
it becomes prima facie valid. Such a card creates a rebuttable presumption of
union designation to be sure, but, in practice, that presumption does not of-
ten prove rebuttable. The strength of the presumption is unjustifiable in view
of the fact that proof of misrepresentation has been made.
VII. Conclusion
The primary question with which the Board must concern itself in cases in-
volving authorization cards obtained through misrepresentations is whether
the employee has voluntarily designated the union as his bargaining agent.
Employees are specifically given the right to join or refrain from joining
labor organizations by Section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
The Board, in misrepresentation cases, has failed to adequately answer the
question. All too frequently, one receives the impression that the question
under discussion is whether the union or the employer will win. Preoccupa-
162. The Board has stated that the burden of proving the validity of the card falls on the
party asserting it, i.e., the General Counsel, representing the union. H. & H. Plastics Mfg.,
Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1966). However, the practical application of this concept extends
only to the point that a card's signature and date have been authenticated.
163. 165 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (1967).
164. Id. at 4.
165. NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc., supra note 130, at 2919. "[W]e do
not think that [the employer] has met its burden of showing that employees underwent a
change of mind or were prohibited from manifesting it."
166. Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 1967). The fourth
circuit is in agreement with the fifth: "[W]hen ... substantial evidence does not show that
the employees signed authorization cards free of any misapprehension of their purpose, a
union majority entitling the union to representation cannot be said to have existed."
Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 66 L.R.R.M. 2529, 2532 (4th Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed,
36 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1968) (No. 1050).
Catholic University Law Review
tion with this question has tended to obscure the significance of individual
employee rights.
The history of the majority status misrepresentation cases is confused and
inconsistent. Currently, the Board holds these misrepresentations immaterial
to the validity of a card; under no circumstances will such a false representa-
tion invalidate a card. Misrepresentations as to purpose do not occur, accord-
ing to the Board's Cumberland rule, unless an employee is told that the card
is only or solely to secure an NLRB representation election. No amount of
talk about an election, absent these two words, will constitute such a misrep-
resentation. And where the words "only" or "solely" are used, a card will
automatically be invalidated.
Several courts of appeals disagree with the Board's handling of each of the
two kinds of representations. Others, however, support the Board to some
degree, so that the circuit courts are in conflict with respect to the misrepre-
sentation cases. The Supreme Court, however, still has not agreed to decide
these issues.
167
The NLRB, by its nature, must render policy decisions. But should its
policies act in derogation of expressly stated employee rights? The answer
must be "No." It is often stated that the Board is "one of those agencies pre-
sumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field
of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an ex-
pertness which courts do not possess ....,168 The Board, in applying its ex-
pertise, should recognize that a union organizer, by telling an employee that
a majority has already signed authorization cards, could cause him to sign.
It should also recognize that a union organizer, without using the words
"only" or "solely," could cause an employee to believe that he would be free,
after signing a card, to vote against the union in a secret ballot election.
The Board, by its handling of these cases, has surely acted to encourage
labor organizations to utilize false representations as an organizational tac-
tic. Such activity should be discouraged.
Both majority status and purpose misrepresentations should be con-
sidered material, i.e., capable of invalidating an authorization card. When
an employee testifies that he would not have signed a card but for a proven
majority status misrepresentation, the party seeking to establish validity of
that card, i.e., the General Counsel, should be required to prove the card
valid. The assumption that an employee has been intimidated by his em-
ployer is not evidence. The card should be validated only upon an affirmative
showing of lack of reliance on the misrepresentation or an affirmative show-
ing of employer interference with the particular employee.
167. Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 166.
168. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
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Where an employee is told that one purpose of a card is to secure an elec-
tion, in such a way that the representation is calculated to, or does in fact,
cause him to believe that there will be an election, when there is none, his
card should be invalidated. Once again, the General Counsel should bear
the burden of proof.
A different rule should not apply where a union petitions the NLRB for
an election and later withdraws the petition, or where a union loses an elec-
tion, but later succeeds in becoming the bargaining representative on the
basis of the cards. The reason for this is that the employee believes that he
will have an opportunity to vote and that his vote will be valid. There is
no justification for subjecting his Section 7 rights to the intricacies of NLRB
procedure. The effect of representations as to the purpose of a card is not
vitiated by a showing that the union acted in good faith. 69
The wording of a card should be considered together with the intelligence
and background of the employee who signed it. A single-purpose card signed
by an employee of average intelligence who was subjected to constant mis-
representations as to its purpose should not be held valid simply on the clarity
of the card.
The principles stated above are designed to, and should, encourage unions
to truthfully inform employees of the uses of authorization cards under
NLRB procedures. They place no unfair burden upon unions, but merely
some responsibility in conducting their organizational campaigns in such a
way as not to impede the rights of employees. There is no reason for allow-
ing a wrongdoer to benefit from his wrongful acts.
169. See supra note 103.
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